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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This controversy presents primarily federal questions arising
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2000). The United States District Court for the State of Progress
had supplemental jurisdiction over the state common law claim
due to its relation to the federal CWA claims. 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has
jurisdiction over all claims on appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether soil beneath the Major Electronics manufacturing
facility, through which PCBs are carried by rain water into the
Bearclaw River, is a "point source" as defined by the CWA, 33
U.S.C. §1362(14).
II. Whether a private party may bring a citizen suit under 33
U.S.C. §1365 of the CWA for the purpose of enforcing the State of
New Union's state-specific water quality standards on a party op-
erating wholly outside of the state.
III. Whether the CWA preempts any federal common law of
nuisance that may apply to non-point source pollution.
IV. Whether the CWA pre-empts the application of the State
of New Union's state common law of nuisance to out-of-state
sources of pollution.
V. Whether Bearclaw River Keeper can show that its mem-
bers suffered the requisite "special injury" that would entitle it to
maintain a common law suit for public nuisance.
VI. Whether Bearclaw River Keeper and the Town of Nobles-
ville may claim reimbursement under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act's
contribution provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), even though neither
party has been subjected to a suit under the Act, or, in the alterna-
tive, under the cost recovery provision, 42 U.S.C. §9607.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Major Electronics is a long-time manufacturer of
electrical equipment in the State of Progress ("Progress"). (R. at
4) Pollutant discharges from Major Electronics' facility have at all
times complied with the effluent discharge limitations in its
NPDES permit and the water quality standards imposed by Pro-
gress. (R. at 3-4)
2006] 591
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Appellant Bearclaw River Keeper, Inc., ("BRK") commenced
this action on behalf of several of its members against Major Elec-
tronics in the United States District Court for the District of Pro-
gress under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) of the CWA. (R. at 3) BRK
alleged that Major Electronics "discharged" PCBs from the soil be-
neath their facility into the Bearclaw River in violation of 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). (R. at 3) Alternatively, BRK alleged the escap-
ing PCBs violated New Union's water quality standards or created
a public nuisance under either federal or state common law. (R. at
3)
The Town of Noblesville, New Union ("Noblesville") was
granted permission to intervene and joined BRK in all claims.
Noblesville also claimed reimbursement for its response costs
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. (R.
at 3) BRK then amended its complaint to include a CERCLA re-
imbursement claim as well. (R. at 4)
All parties moved for summary judgment. (R. at 4) The dis-
trict court granted Major Electronics' motion for summary judg-
ment in its entirety, holding:
(1) the soil beneath the facility was not a point source as de-
fined by the CWA;
(2) whether or not New Union's water quality standards were
violated, this did not provide a basis for liability under the
CWA;
(3) the public nuisance claims were not cognizable because (a)
the federal common law of nuisance has been entirely pre-
empted by the CWA, (b) an affected state's law cannot be
enforced against an out-of-state party, and (c) BRK lacked
standing to bring a public nuisance claim as its members
had not suffered a special injury;
(4) neither BRK nor Noblesville was entitled to reimbursement
for their response costs under CERCLA.
(R. at 3-9)
BRK and Noblesville appealed the district court's decision
and this Court certified six issues for review. (R. at 1-2) Major
Electronics urges this court not to overlook its full compliance
with its NPDES permit and Progress' water quality standards and
to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
592 [Vol. 23
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Major Electronics has manufactured electrical equipment at
its facility in Progress for decades. (R. at 4) At one time, Major
Electronics used PCBs in its manufacturing process, but termi-
nated such use in 1980. (R. at 4) It acquired an NPDES permit
allowing treated effluent to be discharged into the Bearclaw River.
(R. at 4) Although PCBs were never a normal part of wastewater
discharge, its treated effluent was occasionally contaminated by
"incidental concentrations" of PCBs from "unknown origins." (R.
at 4) Major Electronics reported these low levels of PCBs to the
issuing authority when applying for and renewing its NPDES per-
mit. (R. at 4) The issuing authority has never imposed a PCB
limitation on Major Electronics' wastewater effluent. (R. at 4)
Over the years, the soil beneath Major Electronics' facility be-
came impregnated with PCBs. (R. at 4) During wet weather
events, precipitation flows through the valdose zone underneath
Major Electronics' facility, carrying concentrations of PCBs into
the Bearclaw River (R. at 4). Although during dry weather, the
water downstream from Major Electronics does not contain PCBs.
(R. at 6)
Progress, where Major Electronics is located, has classified a
several mile reach of the Bearclaw River running to the state line
as "Class C" waters, which have no water quality criterion for
PCBs. (R. at 4) However, New Union has classified a fifty-mile
reach beginning at the state line as "Class B" waters with specific
limitations on PCBs. (R. at 5) After wet weather events, the PCB
concentration in the Bearclaw River exceeds New Union's limita-
tions. (R. at 5)
Noblesville, New Union is situated one mile downriver from
Major Electronics. The Noblesville public beach and adjacent por-
tions of the river are now contaminated with PCBs. (R. at 4)
Noblesville residents fish in the Bearclaw River and use the public
beach for recreation. (R. at 5) On average, Noblesville's popula-
tion is just above the poverty level and eighty percent of its re-
sidents are members of a racial minority group (Proto-Litigian).
(R. at 5)
In response to the presence of PCBs, Noblesville spent
$50,000 on construction of an eight-foot tall fence preventing ac-
cess to the beach and increased policing of the area. (R. at 5)
BRK spent $500 on warning signs that it posted on Noblesville's
2006] 593
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fence. (R. at 5) Despite these efforts, some Noblesville residents
continue to fish and swim in the Bearclaw River. (R. at 5).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The ordinary soil underneath Major Electronics' facility is not
a "point source" as defined by the CWA, § 1362(14). The definition
restricts point sources to "discernible, confined, and discrete con-
veyance[s]" and provides a representative list of "point sources"
that connote deliberately constructed discharge mechanisms. The
court should not expand this definition to include what was prop-
erly excluded by omission - unconfined and unaltered soil.
Regardless of whether the PCBs escaping from the soil be-
neath Major Electronics contribute to a violation of New Union's
water quality standards, those standards are not enforceable
against out-of-state actors. Major Electronics is in full compliance
with its own state water quality standards. To the extent that the
PCBs entering the Bearclaw River create a conflict between the
policy decisions of sovereign states, the CWA outlines an appropri-
ate process for downstream citizens to challenge those policy deci-
sions. Nowhere does the CWA authorize private citizen suits
against compliant out-of-state actors for violations of a down-
stream state's water quality standards.
The federal common law of nuisance has been entirely pre-
empted by the CWA. The Supreme Court first recognized this pre-
emption in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304
(1981), and has adamantly re-affirmed its holding in numerous
subsequent decisions. In 1972, Congress occupied the field of
water pollution control by adopting a comprehensive statutory
scheme that provides for the regulation of both point source and
nonpoint source pollution. Federal common law, now twenty-four
years superseded, does not provide a remedy for BRK and
Noblesville.
BRK may not apply New Union's state common law to Major
Electronics, an out-of-state party. The Supreme Court prohibited
just such an attempt in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, not-
ing that allowing such claims would lead to a "chaotic confronta-
tion between sovereign states." 479 U.S. 481, 496-97 (1987).
BRK's allegation that International Paper does not control be-
cause it dealt with point source pollution ignores the fact that al-
lowing states to enforce state-specific nonpoint source pollution
standards would lead to the same "chaotic confrontation." BRK's
source-distinguishing effort is unavailing. If Major Electronics is
594 [Vol. 23
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to be held liable at all for common law nuisance violations, it must
be under Progress' common law.
Further, BRK's common law nuisance claims are not cogniza-
ble because it lacks standing to bring a suit for public nuisance. A
private party suing for a public nuisance must have suffered a
"special injury," different in kind and not just degree from the gen-
eral public. The injuries alleged by BRK - loss of recreation and
fishing opportunities - are the same injuries suffered by everyone
who once used the Bearclaw River and the public beach. The fact
that BRK's members were more vulnerable to the PCBs in the
Bearclaw River than the general public does not prove that they
suffered a special injury, somehow different from the general pub-
lic. Heightened vulnerability to an alleged public nuisance, while
it may lead to a greater degree of inconvenience, does not lead to a
different kind of injury.
Finally, neither BRK nor Noblesville is entitled to reimburse-
ment for their respective "responses" under CERCLA. Nobles-
ville's claim necessarily sounds in contribution under § 9613(f)
because, as the owner of the PCB-impregnated public beach, it is a
potentially responsible party under CERCLA. Thus, at present
Noblesville's contribution claim is barred because it has never
been subjected to a suit under CERCLA. BRK's claim for reim-
bursement fails because its response costs (incurred for the place-
ment of signs on an impassable fence) were neither consistent
with the National Contingency Plan nor necessary under the
circumstances.
In light of the forgoing, the decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Progress should be affirmed in its
entirety.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court and may be
affirmed on grounds supported by the record. Williams v. Mo.
Dept. of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2005). Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "By its very terms, this stan-
dard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dis-
pute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
20061 595
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there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Further, the argument over whether "ordinary soil" is prop-
erly included within the CWA's definition of "point source" re-
quires interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Issues of statutory
construction are reviewed de novo. U.S. v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548,
550 (5th Cir. 2002).
ARGUMENT
I. THE SOIL BENEATH MAJOR ELECTRONICS IS NOT A
POINT SOURCE UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
BRK and Noblesville argue the soil beneath Major Electronics
is a "point source" as defined by the CWA. (R. at 5) The CWA
defines a point source as "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, con-
centrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The district court rejected the
claim based on the plain language of the CWA, noting that the
statute lists representative structures that are indicative of
"human-made or human-induced conveyances." (R. at 5); see U.S.
v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Al-
though by its terms, the definition of 'point source' is nonexclusive,
the words used to define the term and the examples given ...
evoke images of physical structures and instrumentalities that
systematically act as a means of conveying pollutants from an in-
dustrial source to navigable waterways") (emphasis added).
A familiar canon of statutory construction (inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius) teaches that the inclusion of certain things indi-
cates the exclusion of the others. The Supreme Court has applied
the canon "when the items expressed are members of an 'associ-
ated group or series,' justifying the inference that items not men-
tioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence."
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).
In Original Honey Baked Ham Co. v. Glickman, the D.C. Cir-
cuit applied this canon in rejecting an attempt to expand the Poul-
try Inspection Act ("Act") to include retail stores. 172 F.3d 885,
887 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Act provided a representative list of es-
tablishments that were subject to federal inspection, including
"any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, packing, rendering, or
similar establishment." Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 606). The Glick-
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man Court refused to expand this non-exhaustive list beyond its
plain intention, noting that "[t]he functions of slaughtering and
packing plants differ considerably from those of retail establish-
ments." Id. Like the statute at issue in Glickman, § 1362(14) in-
cludes a representative list of "discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance[s]" - structures such as pipes, tunnels, and conduits.
Because this list does not include natural, amorphous sources (i.e.
soil) the district court properly held that the soil beneath Major
Electronics can not be characterized as a "point source."
The argument that the list in § 1362(14) does not provide an
exhaustive list of point sources does not leave room for the court to
read into the statute any object it wishes. The statutory language
confines "point sources" to "discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance[s]." § 1362(14). In order to read "soil" into the definition
of "point source," the court must conclude that soil is analogous to
man-made conveyances or structures that modify the natural dis-
position of the land. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 169 (suggesting
that for an unlisted item to be read into a nonexhaustive list it
must go "hand in hand" with those expressly listed). Because reg-
ular soil is not a discrete human-made conveyance, it cannot ra-
tionally be read into the CWA's clear definition of "point source."
See Carter v. Tennant Co., 383 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2004)
("When possible, the court should interpret [a] statute according
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.").
In an attempt to circumvent the CWA's clear statutory lan-
guage, Appellants cite Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., as
support for the proposition that soil can be classified as a point
source. 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980). However, Abston held that
spoil piles and basins dug by miners were point sources under the
CWA. Id. at 45. The "erosion" at issue in Abston "constitute [d] a
component of a mine drainage system" that fits the statutory defi-
nition of a point source. Id. at 44. The Abston Court expressly
stated that the definition of point source excluded "unchanneled
and uncollected" waters. Id. at 46; see also Shanty Town Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 785 (4th Cir. 1988) ("This
definition excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface runoff,
which is referred to as 'nonpoint source' pollution."). Unlike the
waters that were deliberately collected in connection with mining
activities in Abston, the rainwater that carries the PCBs from the
soil beneath Major Electronics flows "unchanneled and uncol-
lected" into the river.
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The Tenth Circuit has noted that "[n]onpoint source pollution
is not statutorily defined, although it is commonly understood to
be pollution arising from dispersed activities over large areas that
is not traceable to a single, identifiable source or conveyance." Si-
erra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2005) ("[G]roundwater seepage that travels through fractured
rock would be nonpoint source pollution . . . ."). The EPA recog-
nizes that nonpoint source pollution is caused by diffuse sources.
See United States Environmental Protection Agency, What is
Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers.' Ac-
cording to the EPA, "[nionpoint source pollution is caused by rain-
fall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the
runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and human-
made pollutants.. . depositing them into lakes, rivers, [and other
bodies of water]" Id. This is precisely what is happening at Major
Electronics. Only "following wet weather events" does the concen-
tration of PCBs exceed the New Union's water quality criterion.
(R. at 5)
Simple gravitational flow of water resulting in discharge of
material into navigable waters does not constitute a point source.
There must be "some effort to change the surface, to direct the
waterflow or otherwise impede its progress." Abston, 620 F.2d at
44; see also Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Util., 13
F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993) (an NPDES permit is required for
"surface runoff that is collected or channeled") (emphasis added).
These cases support the district court's finding that the CWA's
definition of point source connotes a human-made conveyance, or
human modification of natural terrain. Major Electronics did
nothing to modify the soil in such a way that would change the
natural flow of water.
Admittedly, some courts have interpreted the definition of
point source broadly. See e.g. Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1991) (bulldozers
and tractors used to spread waste were point sources). Generally,
however, courts have confined the definition of "point source" to
cover man-made conveyances. See e.g. Inland Steel Co. v. E.P.A.,
901 F.2d 1419, 1423-24 (7th Cir. 1990) (wells); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (pipes or spillways);
Dague v. City of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 470 (D. Vt. 1989)
1. Taken from EPA's "Polluted Brochure" (EPA-841-F-94-005, 1994), available
at httpJ/www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/qa.html (last updated August 18, 2003)
598 [Vol. 23
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/9
BEST BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
(culverts). Even in unique cases, such as Borden Ranch, the point
source, unlike the soil beneath Major Electronics, was man made.
As the Fourth Circuit aptly noted, "Congress has limited the
definition of 'point source' to 'any discernible, confined or discrete
conveyance.'" Appalachian Power Co. v. Train 545 F.2d 1351,
1373 (4th Cir. 1976). "Broad though this definition may be, it does
not include unchanneled and uncollected surface waters." Id. The
fact that groundwater flows naturally through the soil beneath
Major Electronics during periods of rain does not transform that
unaltered soil into a CWA "point source."
II. MAJOR ELECTRONICS' DISCHARGE OF PCBs INTO
THE BEARCLAW RIVER IS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE CWA.
Progress has designated a portion of the Bearclaw River be-
ginning upstream from Major Electronics' facility and extending
to the Progress-New Union border as "Class C." (R. at 4) These
waters - where the discharge actually occurs - are suitable for
industrial and non-contact recreational use and have no water
quality criterion for PCBs. (R. at 4) Beginning immediately at
this same border, New Union has classified a portion of the Bear-
claw River as "Class B" waters. New Union designated these wa-
ters for fishing and contact recreational use and set a water
quality criterion for PCBs. (R. at 4)
A. CWA 33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(1) provides redress in a citizen
suit for "effluent limitation" violations and is not
applicable to the discharge of PCBs from the nonpoint
source soil beneath Major Electronics" facility.
BRK and Noblesville seek to enforce the water quality stan-
dards adopted by New Union under § 1313 through a §1365(a)(1)
citizen suit. Section 1365(a)(1) provides redress against any per-
son who is alleged to be in violation of an "effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter." Section 1365(f) defines "effluent
standard or limitation" as:
(1) an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 1311 of this
title; (2) an effluent limitation or other limitation under section
1311 or 1312 of this title; (3) standard of performance under sec-
tion 1316 of this title; (4) prohibition, effluent standard or pre-
treatment standards under section 1317 of this title; (5)
certification under section 1341 of this title; (6) a permit or con-
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dition thereof issued under section 1342 of this title, which is in
effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable by
reason of section 1323 of this title); or (7) a regulation under
section 1345 (d) of this title
The failure of § 1365(f) to expressly mention §1313 indicates delib-
erate exclusion of a federal remedy for violations of state water
quality standards. "A frequently stated principle of statutory con-
struction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the
statute to subsume other remedies." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In Na-
tional R.R., the Supreme Court refused to expand the provision for
enforcing railroad safety under the Amtrak Act to include suits by
private parties where such actions were not among the enumer-
ated mechanisms for enforcement. Id. at 464-65; see also Aminoil
U.S.A., Inc. v. California State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d
1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Wlhen interpreting a statute as de-
tailed as the [CWA, the remedies provided are presumed to be
exclusive . . ").
BRK and Noblesville assert that Northwest Environmental
Advocates v. City of Portland provides authority for the position
that state water quality standards can be enforced under the
CWA. 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the Northwest Court
enforced Oregon water quality standards that were expressly in-
cluded as a condition of an NPDES permit - the suit itself was
brought to enforce that permit. Id. at 985. Suits to enforce permit
effluent limitations are expressly provided for in § 1365(a)(1). The
permit issued to Major Electronics contains no provision requiring
compliance with the water quality standards of New Union.
Therefore, BRK and Noblesville, quite unlike the plaintiffs in
Northwest, are seeking to enforce general water quality standards
against Major Electronics.
B. Violations of state-specific water quality standards cannot
form the basis for liability in a § 1365(a) citizen suit
against an out-of-state actor.
Congress struck a "delicate balance" between state and the
federal government power to regulate water quality standards
under the CWA. Shanty Town, 843 F.2d at 790. Progress has ex-
ercised its "primary authority" to set water quality standards for
waters that traverse the state. Miss. Comm'n on Natural Res. v.
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Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir 1980). Major Electronics is
now, and at all times has been, in compliance with both the efflu-
ent limitation NPDES permit and Progress' water quality stan-
dards. Both of these necessarily comply with the EPA's federal
regulations. (R. at 4); see §§ 1342(c)(3), 1313(a)(3)(C).
Not satisfied with Major Electronics' compliance with applica-
ble federal and State of Progress standards, BRK and Noblesville
argue that Major Electronics is also subject to New Union's more
stringent water quality standards. In an effort to sidestep the Su-
preme Court's mandate that a court "must apply the law of the
state in which the point source is located," Appellants argue that
New Union's state water quality standards are enforceable
against out-of-state actors under the guise of the federal CWA. In-
ternational Paper, 479 U.S. at 487. Under Appellants' theory,
these more stringent state standards - reflecting only the policy
decisions of New Union's citizens and legislators - become federal
standards, enforceable by private parties against any and all out-
of-state actors who discharge effluent into interstate waters that
happen to flow through New Union. Such a rule would seriously
upset Congress' "delicate balance" of federal and state regulation
of water pollution. See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that, even in an intrastate dispute, more stringent effluent limita-
tions are enforceable only by the state or EPA under § 1342(h) and
not by private party citizen suits under § 1365).
BRK and Noblesville cite PUD #1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994), for the proposi-
tion that state water quality standards are actionable under the
CWA. However, PUD #1 dealt with an intra-state dispute be-
tween a municipality and the state environmental agency over the
applicability of state minimum flow requirements. Id. at 708-09.
The Supreme Court held that states have the authority to ensure
compliance with state water quality standards by requiring appli-
cants for NPDES permits to certify (under § 1341) that their activ-
ities do not violate those standards. Id. at 712. As noted above,
Major Electronics is not violating the applicable state water qual-
ity standards (those issued by Progress). Further, the instant
case presents an interstate dispute, implicating the "delicate bal-
ance" of federalism struck under the CWA. Such implications
were not present in PUD #1. Id. at 707 (noting that the case im-
plicated state regulation of "intrastate waters").
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The Appellants also cite Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91
(1992), in support of their position. In Arkansas, the State of
Oklahoma alleged that the EPA approved an Arkansas permit
without properly considering downstream communities. Id. at 95.
However, prior to bringing suit, Oklahoma publicly opposed the
permit and challenged it at an administrative hearing before the
EPA. Id. Only after the EPA ignored Oklahoma's efforts did it
resort to challenging the permit in federal court. Id. at 97. Unlike
the petitioners in Arkansas, neither Noblesville nor BRK ever
challenged the issuance of Major Electronics' NPDES permit or
Progress' water quality standards. Arkansas stands for the pro-
position that the EPA Administrator's decision to approve a
NPDES permit may be challenged under the familiar "arbitrary
and capricious" standard; it does not signal the Court's willing-
ness to impose liability on an out-of-state actor in full compliance
with the permit and water quality standards of his own state. Id.
at 113-14.
The Arkansas Court outlined the appropriate process for par-
ties in an affected state to challenge the proposed standards for or
issuance of a permit in another state. The Arkansas Court noted
that the CWA protects affected states by:
providing a downstream state with an opportunity for a hearing
before the source State's permitting agency, by requiring the
latter to explain its failure to accept any recommendations of-
fered by the downstream State, and by authorizing the EPA, in
its discretion, to veto a source State's issuance of any permit if
the waters of another State may be affected.
Id. at 98; see also Costle, 625 F.2d at 1275 ("EPA allows input on
[a permit] proposal through public hearings and comment before
promulgating the standard."). As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[an affected state's only recourse is to apply to the EPA Adminis-
trator, who then has the discretion to disapprove of the permit if
he concludes that the discharges will have undue impact on inter-
state waters. § 1342(d)(2)." Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 100 (emphasis
added).
In addition to public input on NPDES permits, the CWA pro-
vides mechanisms for private parties to have input in the adoption
and renewal of another state's water quality standards. The CWA
requires states "to hold public hearings for the purpose of review-
ing applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate, modi-
fying and adopting [those] standards" at least once every three
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years. § 1313(c)(1). Further, whenever a state revises its water
quality standards, the proposed revisions must be published for
public review and comment. § 1313(c)(4).
The process for challenging permits issued or water quality
standards promulgated by Progress are available to BRK and
Noblesville. Assuming that BRK and Noblesville had made an at-
tempt to utilize these processes and were still unsatisfied with the
response, the CWA provides for one further remedy - political
pressure. CWA contemplates the "threat or promise of federal fi-
nancial assistance" as a method of indirect control over state pol-
lution control efforts. Shanty Town, 843 F.2d at 791 (noting that
the EPA may withhold § 1288 waste management grant funds).
BRK and Noblesville may call on their congressmen to exert politi-
cal influence over neighboring states. In fact, a ready-made time
to do this would be when Progress submits its required biennial
water quality report to the EPA and Congress. See § 1315(b)(1)
The CWA provides ample opportunity for public and private
input on the development of another state's water quality stan-
dards, requires that such standards meet minimum federal guide-
lines, and even allows for actions challenging the EPA's decision
to issue a permit. However, it does not provide a mechanism for
enforcing a state's water quality standards on out-of-state actors.
In fact, "the Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a
subordinate position to source States in the federal regulatory pro-
gram." International Paper, 479 U.S. at 490. In light of the fact
that the CWA provides only indirect mechanisms by which
subordinate states can influence a source state's water quality
standards, it would be inconsistent to interpret the CWA to allow
private parties to unilaterally impose their state's standards on
compliant out-of-state actors. As the International Paper Court
noted, "if affected States were allowed to impose separate dis-
charge standards on a single point source, the inevitable result
would be a serious interference with the achievement of the 'full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id. at 494.
III. THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT PRE-EMPTS THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
To the extent that any federal common law survived the Su-
preme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,2
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Court stated that "[elxcept in matters gov-
erned by the Federal constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
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Congress finally buried it under a mound of statutory language
with the passage of the CWA. In Milwaukee 11, the Court ana-
lyzed the extensive legislative history surrounding the CWA's pas-
sage before determining that "[t]he establishment of such a self-
consciously comprehensive program by Congress... strongly sug-
gests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on
that program with federal common law." 451 U.S. at 318-19. In
resolving a dispute over pollutant discharges into Lake Michigan,
the Milwaukee 11 Court noted:
Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal
standards to the courts through application of often vague and
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurispru-
dence, but rather has occupied the field through the establish-
ment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency.
Id. at 317. The Court subsequently interpreted its decision in Mil-
waukee H as holding that "the comprehensive regulatory regime
created by the 1972 amendments pre-empted [a State's] federal
common law remedy [of nuisance]." Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 99 (em-
phasis added); see also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) ("the federal com-
mon law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-
empted by the more comprehensive scope of the [CWAI") (empha-
sis added).
The CWA consists of ninety-one (91) sections, spread across
177 pages of an official United States Code book 3 and provides for
everything from the development and implementation of local
waste treatment plans, see 33 U.S.C. § 1281, and the provision of
scholarships for individuals interested in pursuing careers in
waste management, 33 U.S.C. § 1261, to a precise definition of the
term "pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19); see also International Pa-
per, 479 U.S. at 492 (noting the broad scope and "elaborate" reme-
dial provisions of the CWA). Among other things, these statutes
establish a "national pollutant discharge elimination system"
("NPDES") to be developed and primarily administered by the fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
case is the law of the state" and then flatly declared that "[t] here is no federal general
common law." Id. at 78.
3. See Volume 18 of the Official United States Code, 2000 Edition, pp. 356-533
(setting forth the statutory provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387)
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The EPA develops "effluent limitation guidelines" to which every
NPDES discharge permit must comply. 33 U.S.C. § 1314. Al-
though a state may establish its own NPDES permitting agency,
the EPA may withdraw approval of any state permitting system
that it deems out of compliance with federal guidelines. § 1342(b),
(c).
The EPA also promulgates "minimum water quality stan-
dards" to which all states must adhere when adopting state water
quality standards. § 1313. States must seek approval of their
standards from the EPA, which is empowered to reject any state
plan that it deems out of compliance and impose federal water
quality standards on the noncompliant state. § 1313.
In addition to the statutes, the EPA has promulgated exten-
sive regulations governing water quality and pollutant discharges
in the navigable waters of the United States. See generally 40
C.F.R. §§ 104.1 to 149.111 (water programs), §§ 401.10 to 471.106
(effluent guidelines and standards). In so doing, the EPA has ex-
ercised Congress' demand for "broad federal authority to control
pollution." U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
132-33 (1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972) that accompanied
passage of the CWA).
Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the CWA, the extensive
regulatory authority of the federal EPA, and the Supreme Court's
admonition that the federal common law of nuisance has been "en-
tirely pre-empted," the Appellants (BRK and Noblesville) argue
that the CWA cannot pre-empt common law suits over nonpoint
source pollution because the CWA does not regulate nonpoint
source pollution. (R. at 8) This argument ignores the plain lan-
guage and clear import of the CWA.
The CWA addresses nonpoint source pollution in numerous
places. In fact, one of Congress' express goals under the CWA is to
ensure "that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion be developed and implemented. .. ." § 125 1(a)(7). The CWA
provides for the EPA to make grants to states for the development
of nonpoint source pollution control techniques and treatment pro-
grams. See §§ 1255(b), 1281(g)(1), 1288. Mandatory biennial
state reports on water quality, which are submitted to the EPA
and reviewed by Congress, must include "a description of the na-
ture and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and recommen-
dations as to the programs which must be undertaken to control
each category of such sources . . . ." § 1315(b)(1)(E).
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Most significantly, the EPA is required to regularly publish
"(1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature and ex-
tent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and (2) processes, proce-
dures, and methods to control pollution resulting from [certain
nonpoint sources]." § 1314(f). Based on these guidelines, and
with additional technical assistance from the EPA if needed, each
state "shall . . . prepare and submit to the Administrator for ap-
proval a management program... for controlling pollution added
from nonpoint sources to the navigable waters within the State
...." §1329(b)(1).
The CWA does not ignore nonpoint source pollution, rather it
affirmatively delegates the regulation of such sources to the indi-
vidual states with assistance, and some oversight, from the fed-
eral government. This fact is demonstrated most poignantly by
Congress' own interpretation of its treatment of nonpoint source
pollution under the CWA:
In 1972, the Congress made a clear and precise distinction be-
tween point sources, which would be subject to direct Federal
regulation, and nonpoint sources, control of which was specifi-
cally reserved to State and local governments through the sec-
tion 208 process. 4
Nat'l Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 176 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 8-9 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4334-35). According to the Gorsuch Court,
this Senate Report was evidence of Congress' "positive intent to
leave certain pollution problems to the states." Id.
Numerous circuit courts have drawn the same conclusions re-
garding Congress' treatment of nonpoint source pollution. In Ore-
gon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth
Circuit noted that Congress "drew a distinct line between point
and nonpoint sources" under the CWA. 834 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir.
1987). The Ninth Circuit pointed out that although nonpoint
sources "are not regulated under the NPDES . . .Congress ad-
dressed nonpoint sources of pollution in a separate portion of the
Act which encourages states to develop areawide waste treatment
management plans." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1288); see also Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir.
4. Section 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288, encourages nonpoint source pollution control
through the development of areawide waste treatment management plans by the
states and provision of federal grant money to assist states in this effort.
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1988) (describing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) as "the 'nonpoint source' part
of the CWA"); American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192,
1194 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Rather than vest the EPA with authority
to control nonpoint source discharges through a permitting pro-
cess, Congress required states to develop water quality standards
for intrastate waters."); Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021,
1025 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[To regulate non-point pollution, the Act
requires states to establish water quality standards.")
The absence of a federal remedy in the CWA for violations of
state nonpoint source regulations does not leave federal courts free
to create one out of the "vague and indeterminate nuisance con-
cepts" that have been rejected by the Supreme Court. Milwaukee
11, 451 U.S. at 317. In Mobil Oil Corp v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618 (1978), 5 the Court refused to provide "loss of society" damages
under general maritime law although Congress had not provided
such damages under its Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"),
46 App. U.S.C. § 761 et seq. Id. at 625. The Court noted that the
statute addressed numerous issues of wrongful-death law, includ-
ing remedies, and concluded that when an Act "speaks directly to
a question, the courts are not free to supplement Congress' answer
so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless." Id. If supple-
menting the DOHSA's wrongful-death remedies with "loss of soci-
ety" damages under general maritime law would render the
DOHSA "meaningless," continuing to provide a federal common
law nuisance remedy for nonpoint source pollution even after Con-
gress has "[spoken] directly to [the] question" would surely under-
cut the CWA's carefully drawn nonpoint source regulatory scheme.
It seems highly unlikely, if not implausible, that Congress
would go to such lengths to craft and preserve the delicate balance
of federal and state regulatory authority under the CWA, with the
expectation that federal courts would continue to apply federal
(common) law to disputes under that part of the regulatory
scheme that it "specifically reserved" to the states. In response to
extensive amendments to the CWA, the Supreme Court declared
the federal common law of nuisance (as it pertains to water pollu-
tion) dead in 1981. See generally Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. 304.
Over the twenty-four years since that decision, Congress has
made no attempt to revive any of the rights that may have been
5. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham was discussed by the Milwaukee II Court
and used to support their conclusion that the CWA had pre-empted the federal com-
mon law remedy of nuisance for disputes involving water pollution. See Milwaukee II,
451 U.S. at 314-15.
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lost to citizens or states. Congress intended that the states would
provide mechanisms for enforcing their own state standards for
nonpoint source pollution after they had developed those stan-
dards as required by the CWA. Appellants may not conjure up the
spirit of yesterday's federal law to govern today's state pollution
control efforts.
IV. THE CLEAN WATER ACT PROHIBITS THE
APPLICATION OF STATE OF NEW UNION COMMON
LAW TO MAJOR ELECTRONICS, AN OUT-OF-STATE
(ALLEGED) POLLUTER.
In International Paper, the Supreme Court rejected an at-
tempt by citizens of Vermont to apply Vermont common law to a
polluter located in New York, holding that "[in light of [the
CWA's] pervasive regulation and the fact that the control of inter-
state pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, it is clear that
the only state suits that remain available are those specifically
preserved by the Act." 479 U.S. at 492. Based on the language of
the CWA's "saving clause," §§ 1365(e), 1370, and the legislative
history concerning those provisions, the Court "conclude[d] that
the CWA precludes a court from applying the law of an affected
State against an out-of-state source." Id. at 494.
Yet, Appellants argue that New Union's common law of public
nuisance may be brought to bear on the acts of Major Electronics,
occurring wholly outside of New Union's borders. (R. at 8) Ac-
cording to Appellants, the Supreme Court's contrary holding in In-
ternational Paper is not applicable here because their lawsuit
"deals with unregulated non-point source pollution." (R. at 8)
This argument is both misleading and flawed.
Appellants' characterization of nonpoint source pollution as
"unregulated" is misleading because the CWA actually provides
mechanisms for regulation of nonpoint source pollution. As dis-
cussed supra pp. 18-20, Congress empowered the states to regu-
late such pollution. Appellants ignore the federal-state
"regulatory partnership" model embraced by the CWA, Interna-
tional Paper, 479 U.S. at 490, and ask this court to view anything
over which the federal government did not retain direct regulatory
authority as "unregulated." Such a construction of the CWA ig-
nores "the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution . . . ." § 1251(b).
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The argument is flawed because the International Paper
Court's prudential reasoning was broad enough to proscribe at-
tempts to regulate of out-of-state pollution, regardless of its form
or source, by applying the affected state's laws:
For a number of different states to have independent and ple-
nary regulatory authority over a single discharge would lead to
chaotic confrontation between sovereign states. Dischargers
would be forced to meet not only the statutory limitations of all
states potentially affected by their discharges but also the com-
mon law standards developed through case law of those states.
It would be virtually impossible to predict the standard for a
lawful discharge into an interstate body of water.
Int'l Paper, 479 U.S. at 496-97 (quoting Illinois v. Milwaukee (Mil-
waukee III), 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)). Allowing New
Union's common law to regulate out-of-state nonpoint sources
would create a similar conflict of standards and lead to the same
"chaotic confrontation between sovereign states."
Under the CWA's regulatory regime, a state may decide to
regulate nonpoint source pollution aggressively, loosely, or not at
all. Individual states express their policy of nonpoint source pollu-
tion regulation by incorporating § 1288 waste treatment manage-
ment plans, if any, into their state water quality standards.
§ 1313(e)(3)(B); see Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 172
F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1998). While the federal government
cannot directly regulate nonpoint sources under the CWA, it may
use the "threat and promise of federal grants" to encourage state
regulation of such sources. Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097.
Notably, both Progress and New Union have adopted state
water quality standards pursuant to § 1313 that set limits on cer-
tain pollutants, including PCBs. (R. at 4-5) Each state's policy
decisions regarding the tolerable levels of PCBs in the relevant
portions of the Bearclaw River, including any entering the river
from nonpoint sources, are necessarily reflected in these stan-
dards. Unfortunately, but perhaps not unexpectedly, the policy
decisions reflected in the water quality standards of these two sov-
ereigns are not identical. (R. at 4-5) Any release of PCBs through
the soil under Major Electronics' plant does not exceed the limits
of Progress' "Class C" standards for the Bearclaw River. (R. at 4)
In other words, Major Electronics is in complete compliance with
the water quality standards of the state in which it operates.
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Appellants persist in their argument that these Progress-
compliant PCBs are a nuisance under New Union's common law.
However, applying New Union's common law to Major Electronics'
nonpoint source PCBs will "effectively override . .. the policy
choices made by [Progress]" by attaching liability for PCB pollu-
tion in spite of Progress' decision not to regulate PCBs in the rele-
vant portion of the Bearclaw River. International Paper, 479 U.S.
at 495. The "inevitable results" of such a suit would be those
which the Supreme Court found intolerable in International Paper
because it would permit states to "do indirectly what they could
not do directly - regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources." Id.;
see also Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 414 ("[I]t seems implausible
that Congress meant to preserve or confer any right of the state
claiming injury (State II) or its citizens to seek enforcement of lim-
itations of discharges in State I by applying the statutes or com-
mon law of State II.").
The Appellants' lawsuit will effectively force Major Electron-
ics to comply with water quality standards more stringent than
those adopted by the state in which it operates - something that
neither the federal government nor the State of New Union can
compel. See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097 (the CWA provides "no
direct mechanism" for federal control of nonpoint source pollu-
tion); International Paper, 479 U.S. at 490 ("Even though it may
be harmed by the discharges, an affected State only has an advi-
sory role in regulating pollution that originates beyond its bor-
ders."). Like the inevitable and intolerable effect on an NPDES
permit that the International Paper Court foresaw if Vermont's
common law were applied to a point source in New York, this
court must recognize that any water quality standards adopted by
the source state, and the protections they supply to private actors
within that state, "would be rendered meaningless" should Appel-
lants argument prevail. Id. at 497.
V. BRK's MEMBERS DID NOT SUFFER A "SPECIAL
INJURY" FROM DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF PCBs IN
THE BEARCLAW RIVER AND BRK IS THEREFORE
BARRED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION UNDER THE
COMMON LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE.
Regardless of whether any common law of nuisance that
might be applicable to this dispute actually survived the CWA,
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BRK lacks standing to bring suit under such law. 6 The district
court held that the members of BRK did not suffer a "special in-
jury" due to the presence of PCBs in the Bearclaw River and are
therefore barred from pursuing this suit. (R. at 8) It is both well-
accepted and longstanding law that "a private litigant cannot re-
cover damages for a public nuisance unless he or she can show a
special injury different in kind from that suffered by the general
public." In re Exxon Valdez (Alaska Native Class), 104 F.3d 1196,
1197 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Rest. 2d Torts § 821C); see also Ari-
zona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913) (individual
must "suffer a special injury not borne by the public").
BRK relies on the minority status and income-level of its
members to allege that its clients are "more vulnerable to expo-
sure to PCBs in the soil, water and fish than the ordinary popula-
tion." (R. at 8) BRK elaborates on its members' vulnerability by
arguing that (1) the lack of a municipal swimming pool in Nobles-
ville leaves clients dependent on the Bearclaw River public beach
for recreation and (2) because many Noblesville residents engage
in sustenance fishing in the waters of the Bearclaw River from
positions at or near the public beach. (R. at 5) Both of these activ-
ities, according to BRK, have been effected by the PCBs in the
Bearclaw River and, because its members arguably make greater
use of the river for fishing and recreating, its members have suf-
fered a "special injury." The district court, however, found that
BRK's damages were not "different in kind, but only different in
degree, from injury to the public." (R. at 8)
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS elaborates on what it
means to suffer a type of harm different in kind from the general
public:
It is not enough that [a private individual] has suffered the
same kind of harm or interference but to a greater extent or de-
gree. Thus when a public highway is obstructed and all who
make use of it are compelled to detour a mile, no distinction is to
be made between those who travel the highway only once in the
course of a month and the man who travels it twice a day over
the entire period. For both there has been only interference
with the public right of travel and resulting inconvenience, even
though the interference and the inconvenience have been much
greater in the one case than in the other.
6. Notably, Noblesville has abandoned BRK on this issue to join Major Electron-
ics in arguing that BRK lacks standing to bring suit under the common law of nui-
sance. (R. at 2)
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Rest. 2d Torts § 821C, cmt. b. The "special injury" principle "rec-
ognizes the necessity of guarding against the multiplicity of law-
suits that would follow if everyone were permitted to seek redress
for a wrong common to the public." 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet
Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia, 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (N.Y. 2001).
Noblesville's decision to close its public beach in response to
PCBs in the Bearclaw River has not caused BRK's members an
injury that is "different in kind" from the general public. The
beach has been closed to everyone, regardless of race, not just
those individuals of Proto-Litigian descent. Further, inability to
resort to a municipal swimming pool (because there is not one in
Noblesville) is a problem faced by all citizens of Noblesville - not
just Proto-Litigians. BRK does not allege that its members re-
create in any special way (somehow differently than other citi-
zens) at the public beach; rather, it alleges only that its members
recreate more often. This is the exact type of "extent or degree"
argument that the Restatement rejects. See Rest. 2d Torts
§ 821C, cmt. b. Like the twice-daily commuter who travels the ob-
structed highway more often than the once-monthly user, the fact
that the more river-frequenting Proto-Litigians will suffer a
greater "inconvenience" than others does not make their injury
"different in kind."
Further, the argument that a loss of recreational opportuni-
ties is a "special" injury simply because an individual recreates
more frequently than other members of the community has been
rejected by courts that have confronted the issue. In Gibbons v.
Hoffman, a group of seventy-five (75) citizens alleged that the
erection of a fence that prevented access to an ocean-front lot that
had been used generally by the public to access the ocean consti-
tuted at public nuisance. 115 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1952). The Court rejected the claim, noting that while loss of ac-
cess was "an inconvenience to [the plaintiffs] and may cause loss
of time and the expenditure of effort to travel to a public beach," it
did not "establish special or substantial damage." Id. at 635; see
also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 30 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1944) (ripa-
rian landowner's loss or river use for purposes of "bathing" was
not a special injury different from the public even if landowner
accessed river more easily and frequently); Bouquet v. Hackensack
Water Co., 101 A. 379 (N.J. 1917) (same). Again, the fact that
BRK's members may be "inconvenienced" by having to travel to
another point of access to the Bearclaw River, or another source
for recreation altogether, does not indicate that they have been
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specially injured. Everyone who once used the beach is faced with
the same dilemma as the Proto-Litigians.
The second "special" injury alleged by BRK is the contamina-
tion of fish that its members take from the Bearclaw River. These
fish are not taken for sale, but for personal consumption. (R. at 5)
While courts have recognized the standing of commercial fisher-
men to sue for a public nuisance when polluted waters lead to a
diminution in catch or profits, such standing has not been recog-
nized for recreational fishermen. Compare Burgess v. MIV
Tomano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) with In re Exxon
Valdez, No. A89-095 Civ., 1993 WL 735037, at *2 (D. Alaska
1993); see also State of La. ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d
1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985).
BRK attempts to add a twist to their claim by describing its
members' fishing as "sustenance" fishing. (R. at 5) A state survey
concluded that the average resident of Noblesville consumes
twelve (12) pounds of fish annually from the Bearclaw River. (R.
at 5) It is debatable whether a person who relies on the Bearclaw
River for only twelve (12) of the 199.4 pounds of meat consumed
by the average American in one year is engaging in "sustenance"
fishing.7 The average Noblesville citizen depends on the Bearclaw
River for his daily serving of meat for roughly thirty-two (32) days
out of a 365-day year.8 Such a minor reliance hardly seems to
make fishing the Bearclaw River necessary to support the life or
health of BRK's members.9
Even assuming, arguendo, that BRK's members are somehow
more dependent on the Bearclaw River for food and recreation -
for sustaining their lifestyle - than the rest of Noblesville or New
Union, its claim still fails. In Alaska Native Class, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected a claim by Alaska Natives that interference with
their "subsistence way of life" was a compensable injury resulting
from the pollution of local waters. Alaska Native Class, 104 F.3d
7. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) groups fish along with
meat and poultry in the "Meat and Beans" food group for purposes of making recom-
mended daily allowances. Available at www.mypyramid.gov/pyramid/meat.html. In
2003, the USDA estimated that the average American consumed 199.4 pounds of
meat. Statistics available at www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/spread
sheets/mtpcc.xls#Leading!A1.
8. Calculations based on the USDA's recommended daily allowance for the
"Meat and Beans" food group (of which fish is an included food choice). Available at
www.mypyramid.gov/pyramid/meat.html.
9. "Sustenance" is defined as "the supporting of life or health, maintenance."
The American Heritage College Dictionary 1368 (Robert Costello ed., 3d ed., Houghton
Mifflin co. 1997).
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at 1198.10 While admitting that the "oil spill may have affected
Alaska Natives more severely than other members of the public,"
the Ninth Circuit held that "whatever injury they suffered ...,
though potentially different in degree than that suffered by other
Alaskans, was not different in kind." Id. The natives had not suf-
fered a "special injury" because "the right to lead subsistence lifes-
tyles is not limited to Alaska Natives." Id. Similarly, while loss of
access to the Bearclaw River may work a somewhat greater hard-
ship on BRK's Proto-Litigian members, the right to depend on the
Bearclaw River for recreation and food is not limited to Proto-
Litigians.
In essence, BRK claims not that its members suffered some
injury different in kind from the general public, but that they
were more vulnerable to the effects of that injury due to their eco-
nomic and minority status. Such "vulnerability" claims are prop-
erly rejected under the special injury rule. In Venuto v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., a California court denied a claim that
aggravation of pre-existing allergies and respiratory disorders by
pollutants discharged into the air from a nearby plant constituted
a "special injury." 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Cal. App. 1971). Char-
acterizing the injuries as simply "more severe irritation" than that
experienced by the general public, the court held that "such alle-
gations merely indicated that plaintiffs and the members of the
public are suffering from the same kind of ailments but that plain-
tiffs are suffering from them to a greater degree." Id. While
BRK's members may be more vulnerable to or "more severely irri-
tated" by PCBs in the Bearclaw River, they have not experienced a
"special injury" - different in kind, not just in degree, from the
general public.
VI. NEITHER BRK NOR NOBLESVILLE IS ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT UNDER CERCLA.
Both BRK and Noblesville seek reimbursement from Major
Electronics for their "responses" to the presence of PCBs in the
Bearclaw River under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
10. In a separate order, the Court allowed natives who "fished for subsistence" to
pursue a claim under the special injury rule. 104 F.3d at 1197. However, a "subsis-
tence" claim is quite different from the "sustenance" claim raised by BRK. The
Alaska Natives essentially claimed that the fish they harvested from the now-polluted
waters were necessary for them "[t]o stay in existence." American Heritage College
Dictionary 1354 (definition of "subsist"). BRK does not claim that its members will
cease to exist if they cannot fish the Bearclaw River.
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The district court noted that the claims were only cognizable, if at
all, under § 9613(f) (the contribution provision) or § 9607(a) (the
liability provision). BRK expended $500 on signs "which warned
against the dangers of the PCBs in the river and on the public
beach." (R. at 5) Noblesville spent $50,000 to construct a fence
around the beach and increase policing of the beach. (R. at 5)
Neither of these responses has been completely effective. (R. at 5)
A. A claim for reimbursement under CERCLA § 9613 may
only be brought by a party who has been sued under
CERCLA §§ 9606 or 9607(a).
The claims of both BRK and Noblesville are barred under
§ 9613(f) because neither party has ever been sued regarding the
Bearclaw River PCBs. CERCLA provides that "[a]ny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 or section 9607(a) of this title."
§ 9613(f)(1). The Supreme Court has expressly held that § 9613(f)
actions are only available to parties who have actually been sub-
jected to a suit under the relevant provisions of CERCLA. Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577, 580 (2004).
BRK's claim under § 9613(f) is also barred by the fact that
there is no allegation or intimation that it is responsible for the
presence of PCBs in the Bearclaw River. "The language of CER-
CIA permits only [potentially responsible persons] to bring contri-
bution actions under [§ 9613(f)]." OHM Remediation Servs. v.
Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1583 (5th Cir. 1997). Such a
reading of § 9613(f) is commensurate with the traditional under-
standing of "contribution" as a remedy among liable parties and
avoids an interpretation of the section that is merely duplicative
of innocent party rights to recovery under § 9607(a). Id. at 1581-
82 (citing the definition of "contribution" from Black's Law Dic-
tionary 328 (6th ed. 1990)).
Even though Noblesville itself would qualify as a responsible
party under its argument against Major Electronics (R. at 9),
there has been no legal allegation or adjudication against Nobles-
ville under CERCLA § 9606 or § 9607(a). Since it is "undisputed
that [Noblesville] has never been subject to such an action . ..
[Noblesville] therefore has no § 9613(f)(1) claim." Cooper Indus-
tries, 125 S. Ct. at 584 (denying such a claim brought by a party
who admitted its partial responsibility for contamination, but had
never actually been sued under CERCLA).
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B. Noblesville's "response" reimbursement claim is not
cognizable under the CERCLA liability provision,
§ 9607(a), because Noblesville is not an "innocent
party."
BRK and Noblesville assert, alternatively, that the costs ex-
pended in response to the Bearclaw River PCBs are recoverable
under § 9607(a)(1), which provides:
[T]he owner and operator of a vessel or facility... from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the in-
currence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
responsible for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a State... [and] (B)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son ....
§ 9607(a). The circuits generally agree that a "section [9607] cost
recovery action may only be pursued by an innocent party that has
undertaken hazardous waste cleanup." N.J. Turnpike Auth. v.
PPG Indust., 197 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). In
fact, the Fourth Circuit recently noted that "[elvery circuit that
has addressed the question, including this one, has held that par-
ties . . . who are potentially responsible for cleanup costs under
§ 107 cannot bring § 107 cost recovery actions." Axel Johnson, Inc.
v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 1999). An
"innocent party" is one who is "truly innocent of any pollution."
Id. at 416 (emphasis in original).
Noblesville is not an "innocent" party. The district court
noted that during wet weather events, PCB readings adjacent to
the Noblesville public beach exceed New Union's water quality cri-
terion. (R. at 5) The court further found that the beach was one of
the "only known sources of PCBs in [the relevant] section of the
Bearclaw River." (R. at 5) Thus, as owner of the PCB-impreg-
nated public beach, Noblesville is the owner of a "facility ... from
which there is a release . . . of a hazardous substance" into the
Bearclaw River. § 9607(a)(1).11
11. The Noblesville public beach easily fits within CERCLA's broad definition of
"facility" which includes "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been de-
posited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located." § 9601(9) (em-
phasis added); see also Envtl Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 384, 387
(C.D. Ill. 1991) (area of land that suffered contamination when truck accidentally
spilled its hazardous cargo was "facility" under CERCLA).
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As the owner of such a facility, Noblesville is properly consid-
ered a "potentially responsible party" ("PRP") under CERCLA.
See Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 2003)
(defining a PRP as any party that falls within the definitions of
§ 9607(a)(1)-(4)). Any action brought by a PRP is necessarily lim-
ited to a claim for contribution under § 9613(f). See Id. at 530;
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120
(3d Cir. 1997) ("An action brought by a [PRP] is by necessity a
section 113 action for contribution."); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High
Point, Thomasville and Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th
Cir. 1998) (PRPs "must seek contribution under section 9613);
Axel Johnson, 191 F.3d at 415 ("[A]ny claim for damages by a
[PRP] - even a claim ostensibly made under § 107 - is considered
a contribution claim under § 113.")
Any argument by Noblesville that it is not responsible for the
presence of PCBs on its public beach and their subsequent migra-
tion into the Bearclaw River does not remove it from the definition
of a PRP. See State of N.Y. v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032,
1044 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[Siection 9607(a)(1) unequivocally imposes
strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there
is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.");
Southfund Partners III v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding property owner to be PRP
even though it did not place the contaminating structures in the
soil and never actively participated in any activity that caused
pollutants to be released). Thus the district court correctly char-
acterized Noblesville's action as one for contribution under
§ 9613(f) and properly denied it as premature under the Supreme
Court's holding in Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 584, because
the city has not been sued for a CERCLA violation.
C. BRK's "response costs" are not recoverable under § 9607(a)
because they were neither consistent with the National
Contingency Plan nor necessary under the
circumstances.
In spite of Noblesville's significant response to the presence of
PCBs in the Bearclaw River and its public beach, BRK spent $500
to produce signs that "warned against the dangers of PCBs .. .
(R. at 5) It then posted these signs on the eight-foot high fence
that Noblesville had already constructed to prevent access to the
beach. (R. at 5) Notwithstanding BRK's signs, Noblesville re-
sidents continue to swim and fish in other portions of the river.
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(R. at 5) The district court denied BRK's claim for reimbursement
under § 9607 as being inconsistent with the National Contingency
Plan ("NCP"). (R. at 9)
In order to make out a prima facie case for reimbursement
under § 9607(a), a plaintiff must show that the release of a haz-
ardous substance "has caused the plaintiff to incur 'necessary
costs of response' consistent with the NCP." Franklin County
Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240
F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2001). "The burden of proof to establish
compliance with NCP by a preponderance of the evidence rests
with the plaintiffs." Greene v. Prod. Mfg. Corp., 842 F. Supp.
1321, 1325 (D. Kan. 1993).
According to regulations issued by the EPA, "a private party
response action will be 'consistent with the NCP' if the action...
is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements
[and] results in a CERCLA-quality clean-up . . . ." 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.700(c)(3)(i) (2005). The mere posting of PCB warning signs
may fall short of this standard for any number of reasons. See e.g.
§ 300.700(c)(5)-(6). In fact, it is questionable whether expendi-
tures for informational signs like those posted by BRK are ever
recoverable under CERCLA. See Woodman v. U.S., 764 F. Supp.
1467, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (expenses for signs warning people to
stay away from a contaminated landfill do not constitute CERCLA
response costs).
However, it is not necessary that a district judge list all the
reasons that a party has "failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case"
when granting summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Where, as here, no genuine material fac-
tual issue is presented it would be ill-advised to make specific
findings and separate conclusions. They would carry an unwar-
ranted implication that a fact question was presented." A R Inc. v.
Electro-Voice, Inc., 311 F.2d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 1962) (rejecting a
claim that the district judge had erred by not making specific find-
ings in support of his summary judgment on a patent validity is-
sue); see also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2716 (3d ed. 1998) (findings
of fact are unnecessary on summary-judgment motions).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court's failure to
provide a laundry list of reasons as to why the signs are inconsis-
tent with the NCP somehow saves BRK's "response," it must be
remembered that CERCLA provides for the recovery only of "nec-
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essary costs of response" incurred by private parties.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Courts should "deny recovery
where the costs incurred were duplicative, wasteful, or otherwise
unnecessary to address the hazardous substances at issue." Waste
Mgmt. of Alameda County, Inc. v. East Bay Reg'l Park, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (N.D. Ca. 2001). BRK's $500 expenditure on
PCB warning signs, coming immediately on the heels of a $50,000
fence and policing effort by Noblesville in response to the very
same pollution concerns, was certainly "duplicative and wasteful."
Further, the signs were posted on a virtually impassable fence
that blocked access to the beach and river, the very places to
which the warnings applied.
CONCLUSION
The United States Congress has made policy choices regard-
ing the quality of our nations' waters. These policy decisions are
embodied in the CWA's minimum standards for pollutant dis-
charges affecting interstate waters. These minimum NPDES
standards are applicable to all states and any private actors
therein.
Major Electronics is now, and has always been, in compliance
with the CWA's national water quality standards. The occasional
presence of PCBs in Major Electronics effluent discharge do not
violate its NPDES permit and has never exceeded the minimal
levels reported in its initial application for the permit.
Progress has made policy choices regarding the quality of its
waters. Following the guidelines and processes required by the
CWA, Progress has established water quality standards to aug-
ment the NPDES program it has adopted. These standards are
directly applicable to all private actors within Progress.
Major Electronics is now and has always been in full compli-
ance with Progress' water quality standards. To the extent that it
bears responsibility for the PCBs escaping the soil beneath its fa-
cility, these PCBs do not violate the "Class C" designation as-
signed to the relevant portion of the Bearclaw River within
Progress.
Notwithstanding its compliance with federal and state water
quality standards, BRK and Noblesville seek to hold Major Elec-
tronics liable based on another set of standards - separate water
quality standards that reflect policy choices exclusive to New
Union. The Appellants invoke a myriad of legal theories in an ef-
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fort to circumvent the CWA's clearly defined process for challeng-
ing out-of-state sources of pollution that affect their state's waters.
This process hinges on holding political actors responsible for
their policy choices, not making private actors liable for complying
with currently applicable law.
Neither BRK, Noblesville, nor any party in New Union has
ever invoked the preferred CWA process (as far as the Record re-
flects) to challenge an NPDES permit issued in Progress, see
§1342(d)(2), or Progress' water quality standards, see § 1313(c)(1),
(4). While appellants may find this process unattractive, it is the
process that Congress has chosen and "federal courts do not sit as
councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord
with their own conceptions of prudent public policy." U.S. v. Ruth-
erford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979). The effort by BRK and Nobles-
ville to craft their own, more appealing remedy and then insert it
into the CWA must be rejected by this court.
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APPENDIX
U.S. Environmenta Pro ton A
What is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and
Answers
(taken from EPA's Polluted brochure EPA-841-F-94-005,
1994)
Q: What is nonpoint source pollution?
A: Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from indus-
trial and sewage treatment plants, comes from many diffuse
sources. NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving
over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and
carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally deposit-
ing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even our
underground sources of drinking water. These pollutants include:
" Excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricul-
tural lands and residential areas;
" Oil, grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy
production;
" Sediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop
and forest lands, and eroding streambanks;
" Salt from irrigation practices and acid drainage from aban-
doned mines;
" Bacteria and nutrients from livestock, pet wastes, and faulty
septic systems;
Atmospheric deposition and hydromodification are also sources of
nonpoint source pollution.
Q: What are the effects of these pollutants on our waters?
A: States report that nonpoint source pollution is the leading re-
maining cause of water quality problems. The effects of nonpoint
source pollutants on specific waters vary and may not always be
fully assessed. However, we know that these pollutants have
harmful effects on drinking water supplies, recreation, fisheries,
and wildlife.
2006]
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Q: What causes nonpoint source pollution?
A: We all play a part. Nonpoint source pollution results from a
wide variety of human activities on the land. Each of us can con-
tribute to the problem without even realizing it.
Q: What can we do about nonpoint source pollution?
A: We can all work together to reduce and prevent nonpoint
source pollution. Some activities are federal responsibilities, such
as ensuring that federal lands are properly managed to reduce soil
erosion. Some are state responsibilities, for example, developing
legislation to govern mining and logging, and to protect ground-
water. Others are best handled locally, such as by zoning or ero-
sion control ordinances. And each individual can play an
important role by practicing conservation and by changing certain
everyday habits.
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United States Department of Agriculture: Food Pyramid (Cited at
note 7)
USDA United States Department of Agricufture
Inside th Pyrmi
What foods are included in the meat, poultry, fish, dry beans,
eggs, and nuts (meat & beans) group?
All foods made from meat, poultry, fish, dry beans or peas, eggs,
nuts, and seeds are considered part of this group. Dry beans and
peas are part of this group as well as the vegetable group. For
more information on dry beans and peas click here.
Most meat and poultry choices should be lean or low-fat. Fish,
nuts, and seeds contain healthy oils, so choose these foods fre-
quently instead of meat or poultry. (See Why is it important to
include fish, nuts, and seeds?)
Some commonly eaten choices in the Meat and Beans group, with
selection tips, are:
2006] 623
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Meats*
Lean cuts of:
beef
lamb
pork
veal
Game meats:
bison
rabbit
venison
Lean ground meats:
beef
pork
lamb
Lean luncheon meats
Organ meats:
liver
giblets
Poultry*
chicken
duck-
goose
turkey
ground chicken and
turkey
Eggs*
chicken eggs
duck eggs
Dry beans and peas:
black beans
black-eyed peas
chickpeas (garbanzo beans)
falafel
kidney beans
lentils
lima beans (mature)
navy beans
pinto beans
soy beans
split peas
tofu (bean curd made from soy
beans)
white beans
bean burgers:
garden burgers
veggie burgers
tempeh
texturized vegetable protein
(TVP)
Nuts & seeds*
almonds
casews
hazelnuts (filberts)
mixed nuts
peanuts
peanut butter
pecans
pistachios
pumpkin seeds
sesame seeds
sunflower seeds
walnuts
Fish*
Finfish such as:
catfish
cod
flounder
haddock
halibut
herring
mackerel
pollock
porgy
salmon
sea bass
snapper
swordfish
trout
tuna
Shellfish such as:
clams
crab
crayfish
lobster
mussels
octopus
oysters
scallops
squid (calamari)
shrimp
Canned fish such as:
anchovies
clams
tuna
sardines
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United States Department of Agriculture: Consumption Statistics (Cited at note 7)
1 1 1 1 1 1 i . . 1 12/27/2004
Red meat, poultry, and fish (boneless, trimmed
equivalent): Per capita consumption Filename: MTPCC
U.S.
population,
Year July 1 Red meat Poultry'
Total ITotal' Fish and Total'
Veal Pork Lamb SUM(C..F) Chicken4 Turkey SUM(H..I) shellfish SUM(G,J,K)
Millions Pounds
1909 90.490 51.1 .0 41.2 4.4 101.7 10.4 0.8 11.2 11.0 123.9
1910 92.407 48.5 4.9 38.2 4.2 96.0 11.0 0.8 11.8 11.2 118.9
1911 93.863 47.2 4.9 42.4 4.8 99.3 11.1 0.9 12.0 11.3 122.5
1912 95.335 44.5 4.8 40.9 5.0 95.2 10.6 0.9 11.5 11.3 118.0
1913 97.225 4.6 4.3 41.1 4.7 93.7 10.3 0.9 11.2 11.5 116.4
1914 99.111 427 4.0 40.0 4.7 91.3 10.3 0.9 11.1 11.7 114.2
1915 100.546 38.8 4.0 40.9 4.0 87.7 10.2 0.9 11.2 11.2 110.1
1916 101.961 40.6 4.4 42.4 3.8 91.2 9.6 0.9 10.6 11.0 112.8
1917 103.414 44.6 4.9 36.2 .9 88.6 9.4 0.9 10.3 10.9 109.8
1918 104.550 47.2 5.0 37.5 3.1 92.8 9.4 0.9 10.3 10.9 114.1
1919 105.063 42.4 5.4 39.2 3.7 90.7 10.1 1.0 11.2 11.6 113.5
1920 10.461 40.7 5.5 39.0 3.6 88.8 9.7 1.0 10.8 11.8 111.4
1921 108.538 38.2 5.2 39.8 4.0 87.2 9.5 1.0 10.5 10.5 108.2
1922 110.049 40.7 .3 40.4 3.4 89.8 10.1 1.0 11.1 11.3 112.2
1923 111.947 41.1 5.6 45.6 3.5 95.7 10.4 1.0 11.4 10.7 117.8
1924 114.109 41.0 5.9 45.5 M4 95.7 9.7 1.0 10.7 11.0 117.5
1925 115.829 41.0 5.9 41.0 3.4 91.3 10.1 1.0 11.2 11.1 113.6
1926 117.397 41.5 5.6 39.4 3.6 90.1 10.1 1.0 11.1 11.4 112.5
1927 119.035 37.5 5.0 41.6 3.5 87.6 10.8 1.1 11.9 12.2 111.7
1928 120.509 33.6 4.4 43.5 8.6 85.2 10.4 1.1 11.5 12.1 108.7
1929 121.767 34.2 4.3 42.8 .7 85.0 10.1 1.1 11.3 11.8 108.1
1930 123.188 33.7 4.4 41.1 4.4 83.6 11.1 1.2 12.3 10.2 106.1
1931 124.149 33.4 4.5 41.9 4.7 84.6 10.0 1.1 11.1 8.8 104.5
1932 124.949 32.1 4.5 43.4 4.6 84.7 10.2 1.4 11.6 8.4 104.7
1933 125.690 35.5 4.9 43.4 4.4 88.2 10.4 1.5 12.0 8.6 108.8
1934 126.485 43.9 6.4 39.5 4.2 94.0 9.6 1.4 11.0 9.2 114.2
1935 127.362 3.6 .8 29.7 4.8 76.9 9.3 1.4 10.7 10.5 98.1
1936 128.181 41.6 5.7 33.8 4.4 85.5 9.6 1.7 11.3 11.6 108.5
1937 128.961 38.0 5.9 34.2 4.4 82.4 9.7 1.8 11.5 11.7 105.7
1938 129.969 37.4 5.2 35.7 4.5 82.9 9.0 1.8 10.8 10.8 104.5
1939 131.028 37.6 5.2 39.7 4.4 86.9 10.0 1.9 11.9 10.8 109.6
1940 132.122 37.8 .1 45.1 4.3 92.4 10.0 2.3 12.3 11.0 115.6
1941 13.402 42.6 .3 42.3 4.5 94.7 11.0 2.3 13.3 11.1 119.1
1942 134.860 4.9 .8 42.2 4.9 98.9 1.7 2.4 15.2 8.8 122.9
1943 13. 739 43.0 5.7 51.7 4.6 105.0 1.0 2.3 18.2 8.0 131.2
1944 138.397 46.6 8.4 53.6 4.6 113.2 15.3 2.4 17.7 8.7 139.7
1945 139.928 48.0 &1 43.4 4.9 104.3 15.1 2.7 17.8 9.8 131.8
1947 144.126 49.2 7.5 43.2 3.6 103.6 12.5 2.9 15.5 10.3 129.3
1948 146.631 44.2 6.7 42.0 3.3 96.1 12.6 2.5 15.1 11.2 122.4
1949 149.188 44.7 .2 41.9 2.7 95.5 13.5 2.6 16.1 10.9 122.5
1950 151.684 44.6 5.6 43.0 2.6 95.8 14.3 3.3 17.6 11.9 125.2
1951 154.287 41.2 4.7 45.2 2.2 93.3 15.0 3.6 18.6 11.3 123.2
1952 15.954 43.9 5.1 45.0 2.7 96.7 15.2 3.8 19.0 11.1 126.8
1953 159.565 54.5 .6 39.2 3.1 103.5 15.1 3.9 18.9 11.3 133.7
1954 162.391 56.0 .9 37.2 3.0 103.1 18.6 4.2 19.9 11.1 134.1
1955 16.275 57.2 6.5 50.4 3.0 117.1 14.7 4.0 18.7 10.4 146.2
1956 168.221 59.5 8.6 51.0 2.9 120.0 1.8 4.2 20.9 10.4 151.3
1957 171.274 58.7 .1 46.4 2.7 114.0 17.5 4.7 22.2 10.2 146.4
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1958 174.141 55.9 4.7 45.3 2.7 108.7 19.2 4.7 24.0 10.6 143.3
1959 177.073 55.6 4.0 51.0 3.1 114.7 19.7 5.0 24.7 10.9 150.4
1960 180.671 59.1 4.2 48.6 3.1 115.1 19.1 4.9 24.0 10.3 149.4
1961 183.691 61.0 4.0 46.8 3.3 115.0 20.5 5.9 26.4 10.7 152.2
1962 18&538 61.7 3.8 47.4 3.4 116.3 20.5 5.6 26.1 10.6 153.1
1963 189.242 65.4 3.4 48.5 3.2 120.5 21.0 5.5 26.5 10.5 157.5
1964 191.889 70.6 3.7 48.8 2.7 125.7 21.3 5.9 27.1 10.5 163.4
1965 194.303 70.4 3.7 43.6 2.4 120.1 22.8 5.0 28.8 10.9 159.8
1966 196.560 73.7 .2 42.8 2.6 122.3 24.5 .3 30.7 10.9 163.9
1967 19&712 75.3 18 47.0 25 127.6 25.1 .8 31.9 10.6 170.2
1968 200.706 77.3 2.6 4.3 2.4 130.6 25.2 5.4 31.6 11.0 173.2
1969 202677 77.8 2.3 46.9 2.3 129.4 26.3 5.6 32.9 11.2 173.4
1970 205.052 79.6 2.0 45.1 2.1 131.9 27.4 6.4 33.8 11.7 177.5
1971 207.661 79.2 1.9 53.0 2.1 136.1 27.4 6.6 34.0 11.5 181.6
1972 209.896 80.5 1.6 4&1 2.2 132.3 2&3 7.1 35.4 12.5 180.2
1973 211.909 75.9 1.2 48.2 1.8 122.1 27.1 6.6 33.8 12.7 168.6
1974 213.854 80.7 1.6 47.0 1.5 130.8 27.0 .8 33.9 12.1 176.8
1975 215.973 83.2 2.8 38.4 1.3 125.8 25.3 5.5 32.8 12.1 170.7
1976 21&035 8&8 17 40.7 1.2 133.4 2&6 7.0 35.6 12.9 181.8
1977 220.239 8.3 2.6 42.3 1.1 132.3 29.0 .9 35.9 12.6 180.9
1978 222.585 82.2 2.0 42.3 1.0 127.5 30.3 .9 37.2 13.4 178.1
1979 225.055 73.5 1.4 48.6 1.0 124.4 329 7.3 40.2 13.0 177.6
1980 227.726 72.1 1.3 52.1 1.0 126.4 32.7 &1 40.8 12.4 179.6
1981 229.966 72.8 1.3 49.9 1.0 125.1 33.7 &3 42.0 1.6 179.7
1982 232.188 72.5 1.4 44.9 1.1 119.8 3.9 &3 42.2 12.4 174.5
1983 234.307 74.1 1.4 47.4 1.1 123.9 34.0 57 42.7 13.3 179.9
1984 235.348 73.8 1.5 47.2 1.1 123.6 35.3 5.7 44.0 14.1 181.8
1985 23&466 74.6 1.5 47.7 1.1 124.9 36.4 9.1 45.6 15.0 185.5
1986 240.651 74.4 1.6 45.2 1.0 122.2 3.9 10.2 47.1 15.4 184.7
1987 242.804 69.5 1.3 45.6 1.0 117.4 39.4 11.6 51.0 15.1 184.5
1988 245.021 68.6 1.1 48.8 1.0 119.5 39.6 12.4 51.9 15.1 186.6
1989 247.342 65.1 1.0 48.4 1.0 115.6 40.5 13.1 53.6 15.6 184.7
1990 250.132 63.9 0.9 46.4 1.0 112.2 42.4 13.8 56.2 14.9 183.4
1991 253.493 62.9 0.8 46.8 1.0 111.5 44.1 14.0 58.1 14.8 184.4
1992 25.894 62.4 0.8 49.1 1.0 113.4 46.4 14.0 60.4 14.6 188.4
1993 260.255 61.0 0.8 4.5 1.0 111.2 4&1 13.9 62.0 14.8 188.0
1994 263.436 62.9 0.8 49.0 0.9 113.5 4.7 13.9 62.6 15.0 191.1
1995 26.557 63.5 0.8 48.4 0.9 113.6 4&2 13.9 62.1 14.8 190.4
1996 269.667 64.0 1.0 45.2 0.8 111.0 48.8 14.3 63.1 14.5 188.6
1997 272.912 62.6 0.8 44.7 0.8 109.0 50.0 13.6 63.6 14.3 186.9
1998 276.115 63.6 0.7 48.2 0.9 113.2 50.4 13.9 64.3 14.5 192.1
1999 279.295 64.3 0.6 49.3 0.8 115.1 53.6 13.8 67.4 14.8 197.3
2000 282.388 64.5 0.5 47.8 0.8 113.7 54.2 13.7 67.9 15.2 196.8
2001 285.321 63.1 0.5 4.9 0.8 111.4 54.0 13.8 67.8 14.7 193.9
2002 285205 64.5 0.5 48.2 0.9 114.0 55.8 14.0 70.7 15.6 200.4
2003 291.049 62.0 0.5 48.5 0.8 111.9 57.5 13.7 71.2 15.3 199.4
Numbers in bold
italics are linked.
1 Prior to 1930, except for the war years, 1917-19, resident population only; from 1930 and thereafter, resident population
plus Armed Forces overseas. ' Computed from unrounded data. 3 Includes skin, neck meat, and giblets. ' Excludes the
amount of ready-to-cook chicken going to pet food as well as some water leakage that occurs when chicken is cut up before
packaging.
Source: USDA/Economic Research Service.
Data last updated Dec. 21, 2004.
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United States Department of Agriculture: Daily Recommendations
(Cited at note 8)
How much food from the meat & beans group is needed daily?
The amount of food from the Meat and Beans Group you need to
eat depends on age, sex, and level of physical activity. Most Amer-
icans eat enough food from this group, but need to make leaner
and more varied selections of these foods. Recommended daily
amounts are shown in the chart.
Daily recommendation*
2-3 years old
4-8 years old
9-13 years old
14-18 years old
9-13 years old
14-18 years old
19-30 years old
31-50 years old
51+ years old
19-30 years old
31-50 years old
51+ years old
2 ounce equivalents**
3-4 ounce equivalents**
5 ounce equivalents**
5 ounce equivalents**
5 ounce equivalents**
6 ounce equivalents**
5 1/2 ounce equivalents**
5 ounce equivalents**
5 ounce equivalents**
6 1h ounce equivalents**
6 ounce equivalents**
5 1/2 ounce equivalents**
*These amounts are appropriate for individuals who get less than 30
minutes per day of moderate physical activity, beyond normal daily
activities. Those who are more physically active may be able to consume
more while staying within calorie needs. Click here for more information
about physical activity.
Children
Girls
Boys
Women
Men
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